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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 19 FALL 1984 NUMBER 1
THE SUPREME COURT'S 1983 TERM:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, FREEDOM, AND
THE STATUE OF LIBERTY*
Rex E. Lee**
One of the richest sources for comment by journalists and schol-
ars last summer was the then recently concluded term of the
United States Supreme Court. The individual cases that probably
attracted the most attention were United States v. Leon1 and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard,2 which established a reasonable mis-
take exception to the exclusionary rule in the search warrant con-
text. But the conclusions drawn by the commentators went far be-
yond any case. Their characterizations ranged from "modest
rightward tilt"3 to a conservative domination that was "unmatched
in the Court's recent history.' 4
I do not propose to give my own evaluation of the Supreme
Court's 1983 Term. Indeed, I think it is much too early-probably
by a decade or so-for that job to be done. My undertaking will be
to evaluate the evaluators. I find at least three themes running
through the commentaries on the Court's work during the 1983
Term.
The three themes are:
* The John A. Sibley Lecture in Law delivered at the University of Georgia School of
Law on October 12, 1984.
** Solicitor General of the United States.
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
2 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
3 Press & McDaniel, Reagan's Days in Court, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1984, at 57.
' N.Y. Times, July 8, 1984, § 1, at 1, coL 1.
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1. The Supreme Court's 1983 Term was one in which gov-
ernment frequently prevailed over the individual. The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union issued a statement describing the
Term's decisions as "statist" decisions, not "conservative"
ones.
5
2. Because of the Supreme Court's work over the last year,
"Americans are less free."' 6 Professor Larry Tribe, for exam-
ple, was "quite struck by the fact that the Statue of Liberty
was in shackles and being dismantled as the court was coming
to an end."'
3. The Court has changed from a protector of constitutional
rights to a short-term, cost/benefit analyst.8
Each of these three themes is partially correct. But each rests, at
least in part, on a faulty premise.
I will examine first the proposition that this was a term in which
the government usually won and the individual usually lost. I con-
cede two things at the outset. First, the 1983 Term was one in
which governments won most of their cases. 9 Second, looking at
constitutional litigation in terms of government versus the individ-
ual is a widely accepted way to evaluate the Court's work. Consti-
tutional litigation usually involves a challenge by a person or group
to the constitutionality of something that government, national or
local, has done. The adversaries in some of the Supreme Court
cases that attracted the most attention last Term were, in fact,
governments versus individuals: United States v. Leon, Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard, New York v. Quarles.10 What, then, is possibly
wrong with the conclusion that the Court's decisions favored gov-
ernment over the individual?
What is wrong is that this characterization-government versus
the individual-tells only part of the story.
United States v. Leon and the other criminal cases illustrate the
L.A. Times, July 9, 1984, part 1, at 1.
6 Interview with Charles Sims, Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union, on All
Things Considered, National Public Radio (July 6, 1984).
7 Wash. Post, July 8, 1984, at A12, col. 2.
8 Interview with Laurence Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard University, on This Week
with David Brinkley, American Broadcasting Company (July 8, 1984).
" See, e.g., Wash. Post, July 8, 1984, at Al, col. 5 ("Whenever the rights of the individual
confronted the authority of government this term, government nearly always won.").
"0 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
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point. Why is it that governments are on the opposite side of the
Leons, the Sheppards, and the Quarles of this world? The answer
is obvious. It is not because governments have some inevitable and
mysterious compulsion always to oppose individuals. It is that one
of government's jobs is to keep its citizens as free as it can from
the depredations of which these three were accused: drug dealing,
murder, and rape. The "governmental interest" in preventing
crime is really derivative. It is not asserted on behalf of some im-
personal, unidentifiable, bureaucratic nonentity. It is a people in-
terest, an individual interest. The individuals affected are larger in
number than the criminally accused, but they are nonetheless indi-
viduals-individuals whose interest is in the security of their per-
sons, their property, and their homes.
The point is equally applicable in noncriminal cases. I will use as
examples three of the most highly publicized noncriminal cases de-
cided during the 1983 Term. The first is Memphis Fire Depart-
ment v. Stotts." The city of Memphis was not an actual party to
that litigation, but its governmental decision lay at the heart of the
controversy. The city was required to make a choice between con-
flicting interests of two groups of individuals, both groups consist-
ing of its firefighting employees. The city made the choice, electing
to make layoff decisions based on seniority rather than racial
preferences.12
My other two examples of cases in which "government" won and
"individuals" lost were the Hawaii land reform case, Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority v. Midkiff, 3 and the Minnesota Jaycees case, Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees.14 (Though Roberts was the nominal
defendant, he appeared in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of
the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, so that the contest
was actually between the Jaycees and the State of Minnesota.)
Both cases squarely fit the traditional analytical mold. Govern-
ments were on one side and individuals on the other. Hawaii and
Minnesota are governments; Midkiff and the Jaycees are individu-
als. Hawaii and Minnesota won their cases. Midkiff and the
Jaycees lost. Yet I would be astounded if the ACLU people, who
1 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
12 Id. at 2581-82.
13 104 S. CL 2321 (1984).
14 104 S. CL 3244 (1984).
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characterized the Supreme Court's 1983 Term decisions as statist,
not conservative ones, would disagree with either holding.
Midkiff involved the constitutionality of Hawaii's Land Reform
Act of 1967.15 In that Act the Hawaii legislature provided a con-
demnation scheme under which individual homeowner-tenants
could force the landholders who owned the land and houses to sell
the homes to the homeowner-tenants at market value prices. The
constitutionality of the statute was attacked by the large landown-
ers and defended by the state. But the large landowners were not
the only individuals whose interests were affected. The sole reason
that the State of Hawaii passed that statute was because it chose
the interests of one group of individuals-those who wanted to
own their homes-over another group of individuals-the existing
property owners, who preferred to keep their property rather than
sell it. And many times that is exactly what governmental lawmak-
ing amounts to: choosing between two groups of competing indi-
vidual interests.
The statute whose constitutionality was at issue in the Jaycees
case was a provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act which
prohibited denial of "the full and equal enjoyment. . . of a place
of public accommodation because of. . . sex."'1 6 The Commissioner
of Minnesota's Department of Human Rights had found probable
cause to believe that the statute had been violated because the Na-
tional Jaycees Organization had imposed sanctions on its Minne-
sota chapters for admitting women. 17 The national organization
brought suit, contending that "by requiring the Organization to ac-
cept women as regular members, application of the Act would vio-
late the male members' constitutional rights of free speech and as-
sociation." 18 Once again, therefore, a state statute was challenged
by a group of individuals, the Jaycees, who were defended by the
state, and the state won. Does this make it a "statist" decision?
Did the state's victory strike a blow at the rights of individuals?
Certainly not in the view of large numbers of individuals in whose
interest the State of Minnesota passed that statute and for whom
the Jaycees' case represented an important victory.
15 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
Is MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 3 (Supp. 1984).
" Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3248.
Is Id.
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I cannot avoid the temptation to add two more examples from
years gone by: Lochner v. New York19 and Nebbia v. New York.2 0
Lochner and Nebbia were both individuals, and New York is New
York. The State of New York lost to Mr. Lochner and, twenty-nine
years later, won against Mr. Nebbia. I have to ask the people who
characterize the 1983 Term's Supreme Court decisions as statist:
which of these two early cases, Lochner or Nebbia, was wrongly
decided? Which did more to secure individual rights? And would
you criticize the Nebbia holding as statist or extol Lochner as a
vindication of individual rights?
I have one final caveat. The point I am making has nothing to do
with the merits of what the United States, or Massachusetts, or
Memphis, or Hawaii, or Minnesota, or New York did in any of
these cases. Neither does it control how the Court should have
ruled in those cases. Few people would agree as a policy matter
with what government did in all the cases we have considered. And
few would agree with the Court's rulings in all of those cases. My
point is simply that to classify Leon, Nebbia, Stotts, Midkiff, Rob-
erts, and others as statist decisions which impair individual rights
is an oversimplification which is inaccurate and unfair.
Our natural inclination when we hear the contest characterized
as government versus the individual is to hope the individual wins.
We see ourselves as individuals, not as government. When we are
told, therefore, that the 1983 Term was one in which government
usually prevailed over the individual, our reaction is that that is
too bad because our side lost. May I, as a government lawyer,
plead for a more realistic view of the litigating relationships be-
tween government and individuals?
The second theme of commentators is that Americans enjoy less
freedom today than a year ago, and the Supreme Court is to
blame.
I begin by asking: freedom for whom and freedom to do what?
The day after the Court recessed for the summer, I responded to a
reporter's question by stating that "I reject the proposition that we
are less free because we are more safe."21 Two days later, Anthony
19 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
21 Interview with Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, on All
Things Considered, National Public Radio (July 6, 1984).
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Lewis took issue with me, observing that the ultimate in safety
would occur if we were all locked in jail.22
It is true that security is sometimes purchased at the price of
freedom, and each of us can point to his or her favorite example.
For some it will be criminal law enforcement, for others, govern-
ment subsidies, and for still others, something else. But that does
not mean that security and liberty are always and for all purposes
inconsistent, unless one adopts a definition of freedom that is ster-
ile, purely theoretical, and of little practical value.
I assume that Mr. Lewis's definition of freedom means an ab-
sence of governmental restraints. It is a definition that is useful for
some purposes, but not for all. It is not a complete definition. Be-
cause if freedom means nothing more than that, then complete
freedom would exist only where there are no laws, no police, and
no jails. The point is not simply that that kind of existence would
be less desirable. I submit that it would also be less free.
Surely a concept as important as freedom means more than the
absence of governmental abuse. It must also include some element
of protection from abuses by other individuals-protection that
can be provided only by government. Very simply, crime inhibits
freedom. For the overwhelming majority of people in America, the
thief, the rapist, and the kidnapper pose a significantly greater
threat not only to our happiness, but also more specifically to our
liberties, than do the policeman and the jailor. To whatever extent
our persons, our homes, and our property are more secure, we are
also more free: free to walk through our streets and parks, free to
let our children play in our neighborhoods, and free to go about
our chosen activities and then return with some confidence that in
our absence persons and things that are dear to us will not have
been violated. If freedom does not include these kinds of things,
then it may be theoretically pure but not very useful.
Some may suggest that this argument proves too much. Are we
not also less free if we are hungry, or inadequately housed, or lack
enough money to finance an education that could open the door to
opportunities not otherwise available? Those are legitimate policy
questions, but they are not, in my view, freedom questions. While I
am reluctant to give an all-inclusive definition of freedom, I submit
12 Interview with Anthony Lewis, columnist, The New York Times, on This Week with
David Brinkley, American Broadcasting Company (July 8, 1984).
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that its centerpiece is an absence of restraint. It must include the
elimination of those obstacles external to the individual which im-
pede his or her attaining a legitimate objective. Taking steps
designed to equalize the status of different people or to help them
achieve their goals may or may not be a good thing to do, but it is
not one of the constituent elements of freedom. Freedom is im-
peded, I believe, when government erects unnecessary hurdles on
anyone's track. It is not impeded when government either prevents
other people from erecting hurdles or declines to move some peo-
ple's starting blocks several feet forward to compensate for the fact
that they came into the world with a less favorable mix of fast-
twitch and slow-twitch muscles. Eliminating the negative and ac-
centuating the positive may lead to similar results, but their links
to freedom are not the same.
This is not to downplay in any way the importance of protecting
the rights of the criminally accused. Among the surest measures of
a civilized society are the way it treats those accused of crime and
the steps it takes to rehabilitate those who have been convicted.
And the benefits of this civilizing influence accrue to all of us. To
paraphrase Justice Robert Jackson, whether we like it or not, the
rights of every law-abiding citizen are tied up in the same package
with those of the vilest criminal.23
It does not follow, however,-either in the area of protections of
the rights of criminal defendants or in any other area-that more
is always better. There is nothing in the Constitution or the lessons
of history which requires that in securing the legitimate freedom
interests of those accused of crime, we must completely overlook
the freedom interests of those who are not. Nor is there any re-
quirement that in purchasing a freedom for any of our citizens, we
turn our backs on a common sense inquiry into how much we are
really getting, and how much we are paying for what we get. And
that brings us to the third question.
The basic objection to the cost/benefit analysis which the Court
used explicitly in last term's exclusionary rule cases (and, in fact,
has been using for many years) is that constitutional rights are too
' See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through the
medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty .... So a
search against Brinegar's car must be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman.").
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important to subject to such a quasi-scientific process. The argu-
ment is that the Constitution itself is in jeopardy if we fritter away
its guarantees by reconsidering-every time the issue comes
up-whether they are really worth what they cost.
My first reaction to the alarm over a cost/benefit approach to
constitutional adjudication is that it is precisely what the courts,
including the Supreme Court, have done for decades. Sometimes
the Court has used cost/benefit language; more often it has not.
But whatever the words, that has in fact been the approach. Let
me explain.
The basic function of the Constitution is to limit the powers of
government. It limits the federal government in two ways-first,
by confining its powers to those enumerated and implied in the
Constitution,24 and second, by a series of prohibitions. 2 It also lim-
its state governments by the second of these two devices. Constitu-
tional adjudication consists of determining whether government
has gone beyond these constitutionally prescribed bounds. There
are two approaches theoretically available for that purpose. One is
to balance the competing interests in some way. On one side of the
scale are the interests of one group of individuals, and on the other
are the interests of those individuals in whose favor some govern-
mental, policymaking body has already decided.
The alternative to a balancing approach is an absolutist, per se,
or automatic approach, which starts from the premise that at least
in some kinds of cases the individual interests being infringed by
government on behalf of other individuals are so important that it
would be wrong to balance them against anything else.
The absolutist approach has had its advocates. 26 It has seldom,
however, been applied by any court. The prevailing method has
2 For the principal enumeration of Congressional powers, see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
Other sections of the Constitution grant Congress the authority to enforce provisions
through appropriate legislation. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend.
xv, § 5.
25 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 Among the most recent advocates have been Justices Black and Douglas who have ar-
gued vigorously in favor of the individual in first amendment cases, see, e.g., Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 61-74 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), and in favor of government in commerce clause
cases, see, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 789 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting);
id. at 795 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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been to balance.2 7 This does not mean that the balancing is always
evenhanded, unaided by presumptions. Indeed, evenhanded bal-
ancing is very rare if it exists at all. In some cases, the courts ac-
cord a heavy deference to government by ruling in favor of consti-
tutionality so long as government has acted to solve a problem
legitimately within its scope of authority and there is a reasonable
possibility that what it has done will contribute to the solution.'a
In other cases, the presumption runs against government, and the
governmental act will be held unconstitutional unless it serves a
compelling state interest not achievable through less intrusive
means.
29
The net result is that presumptions for or against constitutional-
ity are indulged. The Court will usually put its judicial thumb on
one side of the balance scale or the other, sometimes heavily and
sometimes not so heavily. But the Court rarely, if ever, concludes
that the values on one side are so weighty that those on the other
need not even be considered. Sometimes this approach is called
"cost/benefit," sometimes "balancing," and sometimes it bears no
label at all. But as long as the Court looks at both sides and com-
pares them, with or without presumptions, it is, I submit, using a
cost/benefit approach.
The cost/benefit analysis is also consistent with common sense
and with the way most people solve most of their everyday
problems. Most of us use an absolutist approach-so that the deci-
sion is always clear regardless of the facts in the particular
case-for only a limited range of personal decisions. Familiar ex-
amples include the ham sandwich for the Orthodox Jew, the cup of
coffee for the Mormon, and for John Madden, whether to fly or
take the train. Most of us for most decisions, however, are balanc-
27 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (procedural due process);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-29 (1969) (equal protection);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-09 (1963) (first amendment); Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 528-30 (1959) (commerce clause); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (substantive due process). For a discussion of who is favored by
the pre-merits weighting of the balance scales between the individual and government, see
Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power and Judicial Review: Three
Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rtv. 231, 273-75.
See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
29 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ers. We weigh the costs against the benefits. The more important
the decision, the more carefully we look at both sides of the bal-
ance scale.
I find particularly anomalous the objection to a cost/benefit ap-
proach in cases like Leon and Sheppard. The issue in those cases
concerned the fashioning of appropriate judicial remedies. It is an
issue for which neither the text nor the history of the Constitution
gives much guidance.
In those cases where the Constitution provides a fairly unambig-
uous answer to the question before the Court, then the balancing
has already been done by the Constitution-makers. The task need
not be, and should not be, redone by judges. There is precious lit-
tle balancing required or permitted, for example, in applying the
provision that the President must be thirty-five years old or that
each state is entitled to two senators. Similarly, anyone who is fa-
miliar with the history that preceded the drafting and ratification
of th6 Constitution knows that it would be quite inappropriate to
apply cost/benefit analysis to determine whether any state could
impose a quota or a tariff on goods imported from another state30
I believe the Constitution itself also makes quite clear that-with
the few minor exceptions expressly provided by the Constitu-
tion-any attempt by Congress to make law must be approved by
the President or passed over his veto by a two-thirds majority in
both houses." And in general, the controlling inquiry must be the
language and the intent of the Constitution. Where the Framers
have in fact struck the balance-and that can be determined from
either the text or the history of the Constitution-it is their judg-
ment that must prevail regardless of any other consideration.
Fashioning remedies for fourth amendment'violations simply
does not fit in that same category. In the first place, in contrast to
the fifth amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion, the fourth amendment has no constitutionally prescribed
remedy.3 2 Moreover, the determination whether there has been a
3o For an excellent discussion of the Framers' intent concerning the commerce clause, see
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949).
31 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
32 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, ....") with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
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fourth amendment violation-that is, an "unreasonable" search-
necessarily involves a balancing of competing factors. It would be
highly anomalous if the remedy for such a violation provided less
flexibility.
Since shortly after it decided Mapp u. Ohio33 in 1961, the Su-
preme Court has consistently clarified that the exclusionary rule is
not a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved but is,
rather, "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect."'
Whether a judicially created remedy designed to deter should be
subject to an exception in those cases where it will not effectively
deter, or will deter only at an unacceptable cost, is certainly not a
question whose answer is anchored to the Constitution itself.
Under those circumstances, I see nothing wrong with courts asking
the common sense question: how much are we getting for what we
are paying?
All three of my conclusions-that we are more "free," that indi-
vidual rights have been strengthened because of recent Supreme
Court decisions, and that cost/benefit analysis is a sound approach
in adjudicating individual rights-are illustrated by the facts and
holdings in United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard. The issue in those cases was whether there should be a rea-
sonable mistake exception to the exclusionary rule when a search
warrant has been obtained. The effect of the exclusionary rule is to
exclude. What it excludes is evidence of the commission of a crime
at the trial of the person accused of committing it. It does not mat-
ter that the evidence may prove guilt beyond any reasonable
doubt. It does not matter that without it, the guilty may go free,
perhaps to prey on other innocent victims. So long as the evidence
was seized in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, the
absolutist view of the exclusionary rule requires that the evidence
not be considered.
The basic debate over the exclusionary rule is a legitimate one.
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24 (1969) ("[W]e simply decline to extend the court-made exclu-
sionary rule to cases in which its deterrent purpose would not be served.").
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The arguments on both sides are reasonable. In almost all cases,
the constitutional violation casts no doubt on the quality of the
evidence. Should the courts go through the charade of determining
guilt or innocence while ignoring evidence which may provide the
answer? The famous question asked by Justice Benjamin Cardozo
a half century ago should still bother us: should the criminal go
free because the constable has blundered?3" On the other hand,
there is a strong argument that law enforcement authorities should
not be permitted to use evidence seized by other law enforcement
authorities in flagrant violation of constitutional rights.
The continuing existence of the exclusionary rule was not at is-
sue in Leon or Sheppard. Indeed, the cornerstone assumption un-
derlying the case for the exclusionary rule-that preventing the
prosecution from using the evidence may deter future misconduct
by the police-was assumed to be correct. Rather, the issue in
those cases was this: where the police in obtaining the evidence
have not behaved in a way that a reasonably well-trained officer
should have known was improper, should we still exclude the evi-
dence? Since we want the police to act as well-trained officers
would have acted, there is no benefit from excluding the evidence
when they act in just that way. The facts of Leon and Sheppard
drive the point home. The question in Sheppard was whether a
murder conviction should be set aside because a judge forgot to
staple two pieces of paper together.3 6 In Leon, the issue was
whether evidence of drug dealing should be excluded where the po-
lice investigation had been careful and thorough, and the decision
to search had been made not by the police but by a judge.37 Deter-
rence is the raison d'etre for the exclusionary rule, and where the
police could not reasonably have been expected to know that they
were doing wrong, there is nothing to deter.
The exclusionary rule cases are illustrative but not exhaustive.
Considering costs as well as benefits carries no real threat to indi-
vidual rights and in fact permits examination of the individual
rights on both sides. People who live in the United States have
more rights and enjoy more freedoms because of the work of the
United States Supreme Court during the October 1983 Term.
31 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
-6 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3426 (1984).
37 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3410 (1984).
[Vol. 19:1
1984] THE SUPREME COURT'S 1983 TERM 13
Neither literally nor symbolically is the Statue of Liberty in
shackles. It is simply being restored to its original condition.

